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ABSTRACT
This paper addresses the issue of the security of Internet Coordinate
Systems, by proposing a general method for malicious behavior
detection during coordinate computations. We first show that the
dynamics of a node, in a coordinate system without abnormal or
malicious behavior, can be modeled by a Linear State Space model
and tracked by a Kalman filter. Then we show, that the obtained
model can be generalized in the sense that the parameters of a filter
calibrated at a node can be used effectively to model and predict
the dynamic behavior at another node, as long as the two nodes are
not too far apart in the network. This leads to the proposal of a Sur-
veyor infrastructure: Surveyor nodes are trusted, honest nodes that
use each other exclusively to position themselves in the coordinate
space, and are therefore immune to malicious behavior in the sys-
tem. During their own coordinate embedding, other nodes can then
use the filter parameters of a nearby Surveyor as a representation
of normal, clean system behavior to detect and filter out abnormal
or malicious activity. A combination of simulations and Planet-
Lab experiments are used to demonstrate the validity, generality,
and effectiveness of the proposed approach for two representative
coordinate embedding systems, namely Vivaldi and NPS.
1. INTRODUCTION
Internet coordinate systems (e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6], etc.) embed
latency measurements amongst samples of a node population into
a geometric space and associate a network coordinate vector (or
coordinate in short) in this geometric space to each node, with a
view to enable accurate and cheap distance (i.e. latency) predic-
tions amongst any pair of nodes in the population. Extensive mea-
surements and analysis from a live, large-scale deployment have
shown network coordinate systems to be fit for purpose [7], mak-
ing them a valuable tool to support distributed applications, systems
and overlays (e.g., [8, 9, 10]) that rely on, and benefit from, the no-
∗L. Mathy was also partly supported by LAAS-CNRS, France and
the University of Lìege, Belgium.
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tion of network topology-awareness. However, it should also be
noted that coordinate-based positioning systems only achieve de-
sirable accuracy, robustness, stability and scalability properties at
the expense of rather slow convergence times – in other words, a
new node joining the coordinate system may not reach an accurate
value for its own coordinate before several tens of seconds or even
several minutes. Such convergence properties would argue in favor
of a deployment of Internet coordinate systems as an always-on,
large-scale service.
Unfortunately, such coordinate services have been shown to be
vulnerable to malicious attacks, providing a potentially attractive
fertile ground for the disruption or collapse of the many applica-
tions and overlays that would use these services [11]. There are
actually two obvious ways to disrupt the operation of a coordinate
based system. First when requested to give its coordinate for a dis-
tance estimation at the application-level, a malicious node could
simply and blatantly lie. Second, a malicious node, or even a col-
luding group, may aim at disrupting the embedding process itself.
This latter strategy is very insidious and effective as it can result
in important distortions of the coordinate space which then spoils
the coordinate computations of many nodes (malicious and honest
alike) [11]. This paper focuses on developing and studying generic
methods to secure the coordinate embedding process (the problem
of nodes lying about their coordinate during distance estimation at
the application-level is not addressed).
More precisely, the embedding process, regardless of the actual
coordinate-based positioning system, works on the premise that
nodes adjust their coordinate based on some comparison between
measured and estimated distances to some other nodes. Malicious
nodes can interfere with this embedding process by, amongst other
things, lying about their real coordinate and/or tampering with mea-
surement probes, to create a discrepancy between measured and es-
timated latencies, so that unsuspecting nodes would wrongly adjust
their own coordinate in a bid to reduce the difference [12]. Because
the load on the network naturally varies in time, so does latency be-
tween pair of nodes, and as a result, the embedding process must
be run periodically by all nodes to track changes in network condi-
tions. This “continuous” adjustment of nodes’ coordinates can not
only result in a drift of the coordinate space [7] but also gives plenty
of scope and opportunities for malicious activity. We therefore seek
to equip (honest) nodes with a means to detect, with low overhead,
malicious activities they may encounter during embedding.
Noting that, in the absence of malicious nodes, a node’s coor-
dinate depends on the combination of network conditions and the
specificities of the embedding process itself (e.g. which coordi-
nate protocol is in use, the chosen dimensionality of the geometric
space, etc), we therefore introduce the concept ofSurveyor nodes
(or Surveyors in short). Surveyors form a group of trusted (honest)
nodes, scattered across the network, which use each otherexclu-
sively to position themselves in the coordinate space. Of course,
Surveyors do assist other nodes in their positioning (as prescribed
by the embedding protocol), but we stress that Surveyors never
rely on non-Surveyor nodes to compute their own coordinate. This
strategy thus allows Surveyors to experience and learn the natu-
ral evolution of the coordinate space, as observed by the evolution
of their own coordinate, in the absence of malicious activities. In
essence, Surveyor nodes are thus vantage points guaranteed to be
immune from malicious activities. The idea is that Surveyors can
then share a “representation” of normal behavior in the system with
other nodes to enable them to detect and filter out abnormal behav-
ior.
We postulate and verify that, in the absence of malicious activ-
ity, a node’s coordinate can be viewed as a stochastic process with
linear dependencies whose evolution can be tracked by a Kalman
filter [13, 14]. Each Surveyor then computes and calibrates the pa-
rameters of a linear state space model and shares the parameters of
this model with other nodes. These nodes can then use these pa-
rameters, to run locally and in a “stand-alone” fashion a Kalman
filter tracking the coordinate adjustments. These nodes can then
use the Kalman filter output (the innovation process), to compare
their observed coordinate adjustments with the one predicted by the
Kalman filter, and flag as “suspicious” embedding steps where the
difference would be too high.
In section 2, we present a general model of coordinate embed-
ding, in the absence of malicious nodes, that naturally leads to the
Kalman filter framework. In section 3, we validate the model, with
both simulations and PlanetLab experiments, in the case of both
Vivaldi [5] and NPS [4]. This section also studies the viability of
the idea of using Surveyor nodes in secure coordinate embedding.
We then describe and evaluate, in sections 4 and 5, how Surveyors
can effectively be used for malicious node detection in the specific
embedding process of Vivaldi and NPS. We conclude with perspec-
tives on our contributions in section 6.
2. COORDINATE EMBEDDING MODEL
The goal of embedding systems, regardless of the embedding
method and geometric space used, is to assign a coordinate to ev-
ery node in the system so that, at any time, the distance between any
two points in the geometric space should provide a good estimate
of the network distance, measured as an RTT (Round Trip Time),
between the corresponding nodes. Obviously, because at any in-
stant in time, the RTT that can be measured between two nodes de-
pends on the state of the network (e.g. traffic load, state of queues
in routers, etc) as well as the state of the operating system in nodes
(e.g. scheduling state generating measurement noise, etc), the exact
value of the RTT varies continuously. However, it has been shown
that RTT values in the Internet exhibit some stability in a statistical
sense [15], with the statistical properties of RTTs exhibiting no sig-
nificant change at timescales of several minutes. It is that property
that embedding systems exploit to provide good distance estimates
while only needing to have nodes adjust (recalculate) their coordi-
nate on a periodic basis. Consequently, the coordinate of a node
can be viewed as a discrete stochastic process, and we will useXni
to represent the coordinate of nodei at “discrete time”n.
Without loss of generality, consider that a node (called the em-
bedding node) computes its coordinate through a series of embed-
ding steps, where each embedding step represents a coordinate
adjustment based on a one-to-one interaction with another node,
called a peer node (e.g. peer nodes are called neighbors in Vi-
valdi, and landmarks or reference points in NPS). Note that when
the embedding protocol requires that a node uses several peer nodes
simultaneously for repositioning, for the purpose of our modeliza-
tion, we simply consider that each peer node corresponds to a dis-
tinct embedding step, each taking place at “successive” discrete
times.
At every embedding step, the “fitness” (or “correctness”) of the
embedding node coordinate is assessed by computing the deviation
between the measured RTT towards the corresponding peer node
and the one estimated in the coordinate system. More precisely,
suppose that at itsnth embedding step, embedding nodei has cur-
rent coordinateXni and uses peer nodej with current coordinate
Xnj . Suppose that the RTT between these nodes, measured during
this embedding step, isRTT nij . The fitness of the embedding node
coordinate can then be computed as themeasured relative error
Dn =
|||Xni −X
n
j ||−RTT
n
ij |
RTT n
ij
. The goal ofany embedding system,
regardless of the embedding method proposed and/or the geomet-
ric space structure, is to minimize a “cost” indicator (e.g. mean
square error) that captures the measured relative error that could be
observed between any node and any other node in the system, at
any time.
As the measured relative errors are fundamental performance in-
dicators to all embedding systems, it seems natural to develop a
model that captures their dynamic characteristics, although we note
that relative errors often have complex behavior (and may thus not
be a natural choice from a modeling perspective).
Measured relative errors are subject to fluctuations of the RTT
for the reasons mentioned above, namely transient network conges-
tion and operating system scheduling issues. To isolate the impact
of these RTT fluctuations on anomaly detection, we introduce∆n,
thenominal relative error that our node under consideration would
have obtained at itsnth embedding step if the RTTs in the network
had not fluctuate. An anomaly becomes simply a large deviation of
measured relative errorDn from its nominal value defined by∆n.
Because many sources contribute to the deviation ofDn rom its
nominal value (RTT measurement error, RTT fluctuations, errors
in node coordinates), it is reasonable to suppose that they relate to
each other as follows,
Dn = ∆n + Un (1)
whereUn is a Gaussian random variable with mean zero and vari-
ancevU .
We now focus on the dynamics of the system in its nominal
regime where RTTs do not fluctuate. In the absence of complete
and accurate knowledge of the system, nodes keep on adapting the
nominal relative error on a pairwise basis with their peer nodes,
aiming to optimize the cost indicator. This adaptation is subject to
an error caused by the other nodes in the system adapting their coor-
dinate (and corresponding relative error) in a completely distributed
way. We thus define thesystem error Wn which represents the im-
pact of other nodes on the positioning of a node at embedding step
n. Since the system error at a node results from many contributing
sources, it is also reasonable to assume that it is a white gaussian
process (with mean̄w and variancevW )1.
Because of the nature of large-scale embedding processes, the
nominal relative error∆n can be deemed to follow a stochastic
process that converges to some stationary regime characterized by
a positive average. As a first approximation, the process∆n could
be modeled as a first order Auto Regressive (AR) model:
∆n+1 = β∆n + Wn. (2)
1The valuew̄ accounts for the drift that has been observed in posi-
tioning systems [7].
whereβ is a constant factor strictly less than one otherwise the rel-
ative error does not converge to stationary regime independently of
the initial condition. This equation captures the dynamic evolution
of the nominal relative error of a node through successive embed-
ding steps.
Equations 2 and 1 define a linear state space model for the rela-
tive error of a node. Our goal is to devise a way to obtain relative
error predictions from this model. Because of the linear properties
of the model, a Kalman filter can be used to track the evolution
of the nominal relative error and obtain apredicted relative error
∆̂n|n−1 (see section 2.1).
The idea behind this strategy is that if the stochastic space model,
and especially its associated Kalman filter, are calibrated within a
clean embedding system, then a simple hypothesis test can then be
used to assess whether the deviation between the measured relative
error and the predicted relative error, observed at a given embed-
ding step, is normal or is the fruit of anomalous or malicious ac-
tivity from the peer node. From this perspective, even if the state
space model considered is crude, its quality should be evaluated
based on the final outcome in term of probability of detection and
false positive rate. We will see in the evaluation section 5 that this
model achieves very good performance.
2.1 Kalman Filter Equations
The Kalman filter is used here to estimate∆n given the set of
previously measured relative errorsDn0 = {D0, . . . , Dn}. Un-
der the hypothesis of a gaussian noise processes in the underly-
ing state space model, the Kalman filter gives the Least Mean
Squared estimates of∆n, ∆̂n. Moreover, it gives the quality of
these estimates through an evaluation of the mean squared error i.e.,
E[(∆̂n − ∆n)2]. This last value could be used to detect anoma-
lies through large deviations of the measured relative error from its
mean.
We will assume here that all the parameters of the space model
given in Eq. (2) and Eq. (1) are known and given. In next section
we will describe how to derive these parameters.
Let us denote bŷ∆i|i−1 the estimation of∆i knowing the obser-
vations of network delay up to timei−1, and∆̂i|i the estimate after
the measurementDi is done. Similarly, letPi|i−1 be the estimated
a posteriori error variance at timei knowing the observations up
to time i − 1, and letPi|i be the estimation ofa posteriori error
variance afterDi is known. The Kalman Filter is composed of two
steps that are iterated. The first step is called the prediction step
and the second one the update step.
In the prediction step, the value of̂∆i|i−1 is calculated based on
∆̂i−1|i−1 as :
∆̂i|i−1 = β∆̂i−1|i−1 + w̄.
Thea posteriori error variance of this estimate is :
Pi|i−1 = β
2Pi−1|i−1 + vW .
In the update step,̂∆i|i−1 is updated to integrate the observed mea-
surementDi :
∆̂i|i = ∆̂i|i−1 + Ki(Di − ∆̂i|i−1)
whereKi denotes the updated gain and is obtained as :
Ki =
Pi|i−1
Pi|i−1 + vU
.
Thea posteriori error variance of this estimate is :
Pi|i =
vU
Pi|i−1 + vU
Pi|i−1.
The valueηi = Di − ∆̂i|i−1 is called the innovation process and
is the main process to observe for anomalous behavior detection
(see section 4.1). The innovation process is a white (meaning that
it is an independent process) gaussian process with a mean 0 and a
variance equal tovη,i = vU +Pi|i−1. Abnormality simply amounts
to a significant deviation from the nominal values of the innovation
process characterized by the Kalman filter.
To run the Kalman estimation, we need as initial values the sys-
tem state valuew0 and thea priori state varianceP0|0 = p0. These
two values are estimated during the parameters calibration step.
2.2 Calibration of the Kalman filter
Before running the estimation using the Kalman filter, the value
of the filter parametersθ = (β, vW , vU , w0, p0) has to be com-
puted. For this purpose we need to calibrate these parameters over
coordinate measurements collected during a stationary and cheater-
free period. The calibration can be done using a maximum likeli-
hood criteria (choosing parameter value such that the likelihood
of observing the measurements is maximized) by applying the Ex-
pectation Maximization (EM) algorithm. We follow the approach
presented in [16] for the EM derivation.
Calibration by EM method.
Let’s assume thatDN0 is the set of all measured prediction errors,
DN0 = {D0, . . . , DN} and let∆N0 = {∆0, . . . , ∆N} be the set
of nominal relative errors.
As all the noises are assumed to be gaussian,DN0 and∆N0 will
jointly follow a gaussian distribution. The log-likelihood ofDN0
and∆N0 can therefore be written as follows:
log Prob{DN0 ,∆N0 } = −
N
∑
i=0
(Di − ∆i)2
2vU
− N + 1
2
log vU −
N
∑
i=1
(∆i − β∆i−1 − w̄)2
2vW
− N
2
log vW −
(∆0 − w0)2
2p0
− 1
2
log p0
− (N + 1) log 2π.
In a Maximum likelihood setting, we wish to find the value of the
parameters that will maximize the above log-likelihood assuming
that the sequenceDN0 have been observed. However as the se-
quence of system state∆N0 has not been observed, this maximiza-
tion is not tractable directly and we have to apply the Expectation
Maximization method. This method transforms the maximization
of the above likelihood function with unobserved system state se-
quence∆N0 to an iteration of successive steps where the system
state sequence is assumed to be known and the parameter can be
obtained through maximization of the likelihood function.
Each iteration of the EM method consists therefore of two steps.
In the first step, we compute the expectation (over all possible val-
ues of the sequence of states∆N0 ) of the log-likelihood, given the
observed values ofDn and assuming that the parameter values are
equal toθ(k). In a second step, the parametersθ(k+1) are chosen
so as to maximize the previously obtained likelihood expectation.
Next we explain these two operations with some further details.
Let the superscript(k) indicate the value of any parameter at
thekth step of the EM algorithm. As explained before, in the EM
method we need to estimate the value of the unobserved system
states to be able to calculate the overall likelihood to maximize.
The variableŝδ(k)i is in fact this estimate at iterationk andπ̂
(k)
i and
π̂
(k)
i,i−1 are the estimation error variance of this sequence of states:
δ̂
(k)
i = E[∆i|DN0 , θ(k)], π̂
(k)
i = E[∆
2
i |DN0 , θ(k)],
π̂
(k)
i,i−1 = E[∆i∆i−1|DN0 , θ(k)].
Expectation step.
The expected value of log-likelihood knowing the set of mea-
sured valueDN0 and the parameterθ(k) is given by :
L̄(θ, θ(k)) = E[log Prob{DN0 ,∆N0 }|DN0 , θ(k)]
= −
N
∑
i=0
D2i − 2Diδ̂(k)i + π̂
(k)
i
2vU
− N + 1
2
log vU −
N
∑
i=1
π̂
(k)
i + β
2π̂
(k)
i−1 + w̄
2
2vW
−
N
∑
i=1
βπ̂
(k)
i,i−1 + δ̂
(k)
i w̄ + βδ̂
(k)
i−1w̄
vW
− N
2
log vW −
p0 − 2δ̂(k)0 w0 + w20
2p0
− 1
2
log p0 − (N + 1) log 2π.
By replacingθ by its value at thekth step of the EM algorithm,
we obtain δ̂(k)i , π̂
(k)
i and π̂
(k)
i,i−1, which gives the expected log-
likelihood at the(k + 1)th step. In the following, we describe how
to compute these values.
Calculating the parameters δ̂i, π̂i, π̂i,i−1.
As explained in section 2.2, the sequence of system states∆N0
is not observable. However we need to give an estimate of this se-
quence to be able to obtain the likelihood. The sequenceδ̂i , i =
1 . . . , N , is the sequence of system state estimates andπ̂i, and
π̂i,i−1 is the error variance of these estimates assuming that the se-
quenceDN0 has been observed. We resort to the solution in [16] for
the calculation of these estimates using the overall measurements
set.
The valuêδi, π̂i, andπ̂i,i−1 are estimated using a Kalman filter,
assuming that the system parameters are set as inθ(k). However,
there is a subtle difference with Kalman filter case described in
section 2.1; here the estimatesδ̂i, π̂i andπ̂i,i−1 do not depend only
on observations up to timei, but on future observations up to time
N ≥ i. The solution to deal with this is to implement a forward-
backward approach similar to Baum-Welch filter used for finite EM
algorithm [22].
For each value of the parameter setθ(k), we first do a forward
step following the relations given in section 2.1. The application
of this forward step results in the valueŝ∆i|i, i = 1, . . . , N ,
Pi|i, i = 1, . . . , N andPi|i−1, i = 1, . . . , N .
To add the future measurements in the Kalman filter, a backward
recursion step is also added. This step consists of the following
equations:





δ̂i−1 = ∆̂i−1|i−1 + Ji−1(δ̂i − β∆̂i−1|i−1)
π̂i−1 = Pi−1|i−1 + J
2
i−1(π̂i − Pi|i−1)
Ji−1 = β
Pi−1|i−1
Pi|i−1
These equations give recursively the valuesδ̂i and π̂i. It still re-
mains to obtain̂πi,i−1. This last value could be obtained using the
relation :
π̂i,i−1 = v
N
i,i−1 + δ̂iδ̂i−1
wherevNi,i−1 can be obtained through the backward recursion
vNi,i−1 = Pi−1|i−1Ji−1 + Ji(v
N
i+1,i − βPi|i)Ji−1,
that is initialized by setting
vNN,N−1 = (1 − KN )βPN−1|N−1.
Maximization step.
In this step, the parameter vector at step(k + 1) is chosen to
maximize the expected log-likelihood. This is done by solving the
equation
∂L̄(θ, θ(k))
∂θ
= 0.
This results in the following set of equations:



























w
(k+1)
0 = δ̂
(k)
0
p
(k+1)
0 = p
(k)
0 − (δ̂
(k)
0 )
2
v
(k+1)
U =
1
N+1
∑N
i=0 D
2
i − 2Diδ̂(k)i + π̂
(k)
i
w̄(k+1) =
∑N
i=1 δ̂
(k)
i + β
(k+1) ∑N
i=1 δ̂
(k)
i−1
β(k+1) =
∑N
i=1 π̂
(k)
i,i−1+w̄
(k+1) ∑N
i=1 δ̂
(k)
i−1
∑
N
i=1 π̂
(k)
i−1
v
(k+1)
W =
1
N
∑N
i=1 π̂
(k)
i + (β
(k+1))2π̂
(k)
i−1 + (w̄
(k+1))2
−2β(k+1)π̂(k)i,i−1 − 2δ̂
(k)
i w̄
(k+1) − 2β(k+1)δ̂(k)i−1w̄(k+1).
By solving this set of equations we can obtain the vectorθ(k+1),
then we iterate with the expectation calculation as described above.
We note that the complexity of the approach lies in the linear
state space modeling phase by EM algorithm that incurs a number
of interactions over N dimensional vectors, which is well within
the capability of modern computers. We will see later that this
phase has to be run on a subset of nodes (the Surveyors). On the
other hand, predicting relative errors using the Kalman filter (sec-
tion 2.1), which occurs on every node, only implies a few simple
scalar operations and is negligible in terms of required computing
power.
Finally, because we expect each of the innovation observation
ηn to be inside a confidence interval of±2√vη,n (wherevη,n is
the variance of the innovation process at time n) with a probability
higher than95%, when a Kalman filter yields10 consecutive in-
novation observations outside such confidence interval, the filter is
re-calibrated by re-applying the calibration procedure described in
this section. Re-calibration is likely to occur following a significant
change in the corresponding node’s coordinates, caused by changes
in network conditions.
3. VALIDATION
To validate our model, we conducted simulations and PlanetLab
experiments for both Vivaldi [5] and NPS [4]. Vivaldi is a promi-
nent representative of purely peer-to-peer-based (i.e. without in-
frastructure support) positioning systems, where the system tries
to minimize the potential energy of virtual springs between nodes,
while NPS is typical of infrastructure-based systems, where a hier-
archy of landmarks and reference points govern the positioning of
nodes.
As the goal of this section is to assess the fitness of the pro-
posed model to represent the normal behavior of the embedding
processes, all results presented were acquired in a clean environ-
ment with no malicious node. While the goal of the simulation
studies is to assess our results for large scale coordinate-based sys-
tems, the PlanetLab experiments aim to show their applicability in
real-world conditions.
The PlanetLab experiments were conducted over a set of 280
PlanetLab nodes spread world-wide. In this paper, we discuss a
representative set of experimental results conducted over several
days in December 2006.
The simulations were driven by a matrix of inter-host Internet
RTTs (the “King” dataset) to model latencies based on real world
measurements. This dataset contains the pair-wise RTTs between
1740 Internet DNS servers collected using the King method [17]
and was used to generate a topology with 1740 overlay nodes.
In the case of Vivaldi, each node had 64 neighbors (i.e. was at-
tached to 64 springs), 32 of which being chosen to be closer than 50
ms. The constant fractionCc for the adaptive timestep (see [5] for
details) is set to 0.25. A 2-dimensional coordinate space augmented
with a height vector was used.
For NPS, we considered an 8-dimensional Euclidean space for
the embedding. We used an NPS positioning hierarchy with 4 lay-
ers. The top layer had a set of 20 well separated permanent land-
marks. Each subsequent layer then had 20% of nodes randomly
chosen as reference points. The security mechanism already pro-
posed in NPS, shown to be too primitive in [11], was turned on and
its sensitivity was set to 4 (see [4] for details).
When needed, Surveyor nodes were chosen at random2.
3.1 Assumption Validation
In section 2, the assumption that the system errorWn follows a
gaussian distribution was made. This is fundamental to the appli-
cability of the Kalman filter framework. Every node calibrated its
own Kalman filter based on the observation of its own embedding,
and we checked this assumption by applying the Lillie test [18], a
robust version of the well known kolmogoroff-Smirnov goodness-
of-fit test, to whitened filter inputs. We observed that the Lillie
test leads to only 14 gaussian fitting rejections in simulations (over
1720 samples) and 5 rejections in PlanetLab (over 260 samples).
This test allows us to conclude that the hypothesis we took for the
Kalman model is valid. In addition, we plot in figure 1 the Quantile-
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Figure 1: Quantile-Quantile plot of 2 innovation processes.
Quantile (QQ) plots of 2 innovation processes (for both Vivaldi and
NPS) taken on PlanetLab nodes running their own Kalman filter.
These plots, typical of observations on all nodes, show that each of
these distributions indeed closely follows a Gaussian distribution.
3.2 Effective Behavior Representation
From section 2, it is clear that the Kalman filter modelization at-
tempts to represent the behavior of the embedding process by cap-
turing the dynamics of the system through its convergence behavior
2Note that in NPS, all permanent landmarks also act as Surveyors.
(by tracking of relative errors over time). In this section, we there-
fore assess the representational power of this approach by having
each node calibrate its own Kalman filter from the measurements it
observed during the embedding of its own coordinates, in a cheat-
free regime. Then, once the model has converged at every node
(i.e. the EM method has converged and the variations of all theθ
components become smaller than 0.02), a new embedding process
is started (i.e. the nodes forget their coordinates and rejoin the sys-
tem). During this second embedding process, the prediction error,
that is the absolute value between the error predicted by the node’s
Kalman filter and the measured actual error, is measured.
Figure 2 shows a typical evolution of actual (measured) relative
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Figure 2: Prediction errors (PlanetLab node).
errors and predicted errors for a node on PlanetLab (for Vivaldi,
but similar behavior was observed for NPS). The two curves of the
top graph of the figure are so similar that they are almost indistin-
guishable. The bottom graph of the figure represents the prediction
error which is the difference between these two curves (note the
different scale used for this graph). We see that the prediction er-
rors are small which shows that a node’s calibrated Kalman filter
can capture effectively the node’s behavior “in the wild”.
Figure 3 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of all
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Figure 3: CDF of prediction errors.
the prediction errors observed across all nodes in the system. This
confirms that the vast majority of predictions are indeed excellent.
This demonstrates the power and generality of the model in cap-
turing the dynamics of the system and its adaptability to current
system conditions.
However, there are a few “outlier” predictions with large errors.
To better understand their nature, we show in table 1 the repartition
of prediction errors in error intervals. The table shows the number
of nodes with prediction errors in this interval, the number of occur-
rences of the smallest prediction error observed in the interval, and
the number of occurrences of the largest prediction errors observed
in the interval (e.g. Number of node(s)/number of observed min
error/number of observed max error). We see that only a few nodes
contribute (sometimes very many) large prediction errors. Looking
further, we identified 3 nodes, all located in India, who contributed
consistently to the “tail” of the CDF in figure 3. It is interesting to
note that these nodes exhibited large (> 0.75) average measured
relative errors during embedding, and were clearly having trouble
with the embedding process itself, due to adverse network condi-
tions.
Table 1: Prediction Error Histogram
Error Interval (Vivaldi) (NPS)
0.0-0.05 257/830/922 232/854/943
0.05-0.1 32/201/995 44/180/941
0.1-0.15 5/3/992 18/5/229
0.15-0.2 1/997/997 2/12/884
0.4-0.45 4/3/56 3/5/12
0.45-0.5 1/12/12 2/1/17
0.5-0.55 1/985/985 2/32/40
0.6-0.65 - 1/851/851
3.3 Representativeness of Surveyors
If a subset of nodes in the system (called Surveyor nodes) are
trusted and use each other exclusively to compute their own coor-
dinates, they will be immune to the effects of malicious behavior
during embedding. The premise of our work is that the “clean”
(normal) system behavior thus learnt can then be shared with other
nodes and used by these nodes to detect malicious behavior they
may be subjected to by other nodes in the system. This obviously
assumes that the behavior of the system as observed by Surveyors
can approximate or represent well enough the normal behavior of
the system as observed by other nodes in the absence of malicious
behavior. In the following validation of this assumption, Surveyors
are chosen at random in the node population.
Note that a random choice will give an upper bound on the num-
ber of Surveyors needed. Indeed, intuitively, Surveyors should be
roughly uniformly distributed in the system to be representative of
most other nodes. However, choosing nodes at random in the sys-
tem does not yield a uniform distribution of Surveyors (i.e. “Sur-
veyor clusters” appear) and therefore not every new Surveyor in-
creases representativeness. Consequently, more Surveyors must be
chosen in order to achieve a good coverage of the system, than
if they were placed more strategically. Nevertheless, the random
choice method does provide general results, without the need to ad-
dress the question of optimal Surveyor deployment strategy (which
we leave as future work).
One of the first questions to answer is how many Surveyors are
needed to be representative of the rest of the population. Noting
that our model is based on measured relative errors and that each
node in the system observes a series (i.e. distribution) of such er-
rors, we characterize the system-wide relative error behavior as the
CDF of the95th percentiles of the relative errors observed at each
(normal) node (i.e. the distribution is made up of the95th per-
centile value observed at every node). We then compare this CDF
with those of the95th percentiles of the relative errors observed
across a varying population of Surveyors. The choice of the95th
percentile is so that outliers, as observed in section 3.2, do not skew
the results, while preserving a high degree of generality. Figure 4,
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Figure 4: Impact of Surveyor population size on repretentative-
ness.
obtained by simulations of Vivaldi, indicates that a population of
Surveyors of about8% of the overall population is closely rep-
resentative of this overall population (because the CDF for these
populations in the figure are similar).
To generalize this result, we then repeated the experiment, using
both simulations and PlanetLab measurements, on a Vivaldi system
with 8% of Surveyors. We again chose to represent the system
by the distribution of the95th percentile of the measured relative
errors (figure 5).
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Figure 5: Representativeness with 8% Surveyor nodes.
These experiments confirm that less than10% of randomly cho-
sen Surveyor nodes is enough to gain a good representation of the
system behavior. Similar results were observed for NPS. We note
that 8% to 10% of the overall node population is a very strin-
gent requirement for most practical purposes and can representa
huge number of nodes. However, as already pointed out above,
random Surveyor deployment is not optimal and this value is an
upper bound on the number of Surveyors needed. To gain further
insight into how conservative this upper bound may be, we tried
a simple k-means clustering algorithm for Surveyor deployment.
Figure 4 shows that when taking cluster heads as Surveyors, good
representativeness can be achieved with roughly1% of Surveyors.
Although this does not give much indication as to what the lower
bound on the number of Surveyors needed is in the case of op-
timal Surveyor deployment, it nevertheless shows that simple de-
ployment methods can reduce requirements considerably and that
the upper bound yielded by random deployment is indeed very con-
servative.
Having shown that a population of Surveyors can represent the
overall system, the next question is how well the behavior of the
system as captured by the Kalman filter calibrated by a Surveyor,
can represent the behavior of a single (normal) node. To answer
this question, we carried out an experiment where a population of
nodes took part in a Vivaldi embedding on PlanetLab. Each node
used the Kalman filter of every Surveyor and generated multiple
prediction errors (one per Surveyor) at every embedding step.
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Figure 6: Maximum prediction errors with Surveyor filter pa-
rameters (PlanetLab).
Figure 6 shows the maximum prediction error yielded by each
Surveyor, for each normal node in the system, observed during this
experiment. What we observe is that although each normal node
can find at least one Surveyor node whose Kalman filter yields very
low prediction errors, not every Surveyor is a good representative
for any given normal node. The Surveyor chosen as a representativ
by a normal node is therefore important to achieve good prediction
performance (and thus good malicious behavior detection).
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Figure 7: Correlation between ’Node-Surveyor’ RTTs and es-
timation accuracy (PlanetLab).
Figure 7 plots the prediction accuracy (measured as an average
prediction error) against the distance (measured as an RTT) be-
tween a node and the corresponding Surveyor, as observed during
the PlanetLab experiment. It is clear that better locality between a
node and its Surveyor yields more accurate predictions. This prop-
erty seems intuitive, as a Surveyor closer in terms of RTT will also
be closer in the geometric space, and will thus be more likely to
experience dynamics of the coordinate system similar to that of the
local area where the node resides. This is confirmed in figure 8
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Figure 8: Maximum prediction errors with closest Surveyor.
which shows the maximum prediction error, observed for Vivaldi
on PlanetLab, when nodes use the closest Surveyor as their repre-
sentative. Similar results were observed for PlanetLab experiments
with NPS.
Finally, it is again important to note that all the results in this sec-
tion were obtained with randomly chosen Surveyors. Strategically
placing Surveyors to ensure a better coverage of the network and
coordinate space, would simply improve the prediction accuracy,
while reducing the number of Surveyors required.
4. MALICIOUS BEHAVIOR DETECTION
The previous section has shown that normal node behavior can
be modeled by a Kalman filter. More importantly, it has also been
shown that this technique is powerful and robust enough that the
normal behavior model captured on one node is readily and effec-
tively applicable on other nearby nodes. This property leads to the
idea of Surveyors.
Surveyors are a set of nodes in the coordinate space that exclu-
sively use each other to compute their own coordinates. In other
words, in Vivaldi, Surveyors only use other Surveyors as neighbors,
while in NPS, they only use other Surveyors as reference points
(note that in NPS, all landmarks also act as Surveyors, although
not all reference points will be Surveyors). Of course, Surveyors
can, and will be chosen as neighbors or reference points by other
(non-Surveyor) nodes in the system, but the point is that a Surveyor
adjusts its coordinate solely in response to embedding steps (i.e.
measurements) with other Surveyors. If Surveyors run a clean ver-
sion of the coordinate embedding software and they are carefully
kept clean of malicious software, such as viruses or worms, that
could implement malicious modifications to the embedding, then
they can be considered as clean, honest nodes. Because Surveyors
only interact with each other during their own embedding, they are
therefore immune to malicious or anomalous behavior in the sys-
tem, and they therefore observe the behavior of the system in clean,
normal conditions. The idea is then to use the thus obtained nor-
mal behavior model as a basis for anomalous behavior detection at
other nodes of the system. To do so, nodes use the parameters of
the Kalman filter calibrated at a nearby Surveyor.
It is important to note that the proposed method is entirely dis-
tributed as each node has its own filter. Indeed, Surveyors calibrate
and recalibrate their own filter as needed, depending on varying net-
work conditions, and share the resulting filter parameters with other
nodes, but they take no further active part in anomalous behavior
detection at other nodes. When a node’s filter needs re-calibrating
(e.g. because it starts giving too many detection alarms), the node
simply obtains fresh filter parameters from a Surveyor.
4.1 Anomalous Behavior Detection Method
At each embedding step, a node computes a measured relative er-
ror Dn towards a peer node. Recall from section 2 that the Kalman
filter at the node can providê∆n|n−1, the predicted relative error
from the previously measured relative errors. The innovation pro-
cess of the Kalman filter yields the deviation between the measured
and predicted relative errors,ηn = (Dn − ∆̂n|n−1), which, in a
system without malicious node, follows a zero-mean gaussian dis-
tribution with variancevη,n = vU + Pn|n−1 (also yielded by the
filter).
This allows us to detect malicious behavior as a simple hypoth-
esis test. LetH0 be the hypothesis that the peer node has a normal
behavior (i.e. it is honest). The hypothesis testing simply con-
sists of assessing whether the deviation between the measured and
predicted relative errors is normal enough under expected system
behavior. Given a “significance level”α, which determines the
“aggressivity” or “strictness” of the test, the problem is to find the
threshold valuetn such that
P (|Dn − ∆̂n|n−1| ≥ tn | H0) = α. (3)
But since, under hypothesisH0, (Dn − ∆̂n|n−1) follows a zero-
mean normal distribution with variancevη,n, we also have that
P (|Dn − ∆̂n|n−1| ≥ tn | H0) = 2Q(tn/
√
vη,n), (4)
whereQ(x) = 1−Φ(x), with Φ(x) being the CDF of a zero-mean,
unit-variance normal distribution.
From equations 3 and 4, we therefore have
tn =
√
vη,nQ
−1(α/2). (5)
If the observed deviation exceeds the threshold given by equa-
tion 5, then the hypothesis is rejected, the peer node is flagged as
suspicious, the embedding step is aborted and the measured relative
errorDn is discarded (i.e. it is not used to update the state of the
filter).
Note that a suspicious node, as detected by this test, is not nec-
essarily associated with malicious intent, but could be caused by
changing network conditions. Honest nodes classified as suspi-
cious represent false positives and have little impact on the system
as long as their occurrence is low. The trade-off between aggres-
sivity and strictness of the test is represented by the so called ROC
(Receiver Operation Characteristic) curves [19]. These curves plot
the true positive rate versus the false positive rate,i.e. the probabil-
ity of correctly detecting a malicious node versus the probability of
labelling an honest node as malicious. In practice trying to increase
the true positive rate (the probability of malicious node detection)
comes at the cost of increasing the false positive rate.
4.2 Generic Detection protocol
In general, on identifying a peer node as suspicious, a node will
replace it, that is choose a new neighbor in Vivaldi or a new refer-
ence point in NPS.
The only exception to this rule is when the node was embedding
against the peer node for the very first time. In this particular case,
the node uses its local errorel3 as an indicator of the confidence
it has in its own coordinates, to carry out a second hypothesis test
identical to that presented in the previous section, but this time with
a confidence level ofelα. If the test is accepted, then the peer node
3el is the exponential moving weighted average of the measured
relative errors of all previously completed embedding steps.
gets a reprieve and is not replaced, so that a second embedding
against this peer node will be attempted at a later time.
The main idea behind this potential reprieve for first-time peer
nodes is that a node whose coordinate has already converged to-
wards its true value can afford a few aborted embedding steps with
very little impact on the accuracy of its coordinate. On the other
hand, a new peer node which is in the process of joining the net-
work may trigger the abortion of an embedding step, simply be-
cause its coordinate has not converged yet (as opposed to because
it displays a malicious behavior). In this case, the reprieve simply
gives time to the new (joining) peer node to converge before be-
ing identified as malicious. Of course an embedding node which is
not confident in its coordinate must strive to reduce the number of
aborted embedding steps so not to compromise its convergence in
the system, and will therefore grant fewer reprieves (because itsel
is higher) than a node that has already converged.
Finally, we use a simple mechanism for the selection of the Sur-
veyor from which a node obtains its calibrated Kalman filter. All
Surveyor nodes register with an infrastructure server (e.g. the mem-
bership server in NPS can act as Surveyor registrar, while in Vi-
valdi such server must either be introduced or at least integrated
inside an existing bootstrap infrastructure). On joining the coordi-
nate system, a node interrogates this server to obtain the identity
of several (randomly chosen) Surveyors. The node then measures
its distance to these Surveyors and selects the closest one as repre-
sentative. From there on, the node fully complies to the embedding
protocol rules, except that it will use our detection method to accept
or reject embedding steps.
However, when the node has rejected half of its current peer
nodes during a same embedding round, it will seek to acquire a
new filter as the high rejection rate may indicate that the filter pa-
rameters in use may have become stale (i.e. the filter needs “re-
calibrating”). The node then gets from its current Surveyor (or,
as a fallback, any other Surveyors it knows, or the infrastructure
server) the list of all the Surveyors it knows. After acquiring the
current coordinates of these Surveyors, the node selects the closest
one (in term of estimated distance) and obtains its Kalman filter pa-
rameters. Note that in the experiments we have carried out, which
are described below, we observed very few “recalibrations”, so this
very simple Surveyor selection mechanism was appropriate. How-
ever, more sophisticated approaches can be considered if need be.
5. EVALUATION
We evaluate the effectiveness of the simple anomalous/malicious
behavior detection method in securing both Vivaldi and NPS. For
each of these embedding protocols, we chose the most potent at-
tack described in [11] and experimented with various populations
of malicious nodes within the experimental set-up described in sec-
tion 3. On PlanetLab, all these experiments were run concurrently
so as to experience the same network conditions. In line with the
results of section 3.3, the population of Surveyors was set to 8% of
the overall population. Surveyors and malicious nodes were chosen
at random.
We only present PlanetLab results, as simulation results are al-
ways equivalent or better.
5.1 Performance Metrics
To characterize the performance of our detection test, we use
the classical false/true positives/negatives indicators. Specifically,
a negative is a normal embedding step which should therefore be
accepted by the test and completed. Apositive is a malicious em-
bedding step (i.e. where either, or both, the distance estimation
and distance measurement between the node and its peer node have
been tampered with) which should therefore be rejected by the test
and aborted. The number of negatives (resp. positives) in the pop-
ulation comprising all the embedding steps isPN (resp.PP ).
A false negative is a malicious embedding step that has been
wrongly classified by the test as negative, and has therefore been
wrongly completed. Afalse positive is a normal embedding step
that has been wrongly rejected by the test and therefore wrongly
aborted. True positives (resp. true negatives) are positives (resp.
negatives) that have been correctly reported by the test and there-
fore have been rightly aborted (resp. completed). The number of
false negatives (resp. false positives, true negatives and true posi-
tives) reported by the test isTFN (resp.TFP , TTN andTTP ).
We use the notion ofalse negative rate (FNR) which is the
proportion of all the malicious embedding steps that have been
wrongly reported as normal by the test, andFNR = TFN/PP .
The false positive rate (FPR) is the proportion of all the normal
embedding steps that have been wrongly reported as positive by the
test, soFPR = TFP /PN . Similarly, thetrue positive rate (TPR) is
the proportion of malicious embedding steps that have been rightly
reported as malicious by the test, and we haveTPR = TTP /PP .
The true positive test fraction (TPTF) is the proportion of
positive tests that correctly identified malicious embedding steps
(TPTF = TTP /(TTP + TFP )).
5.2 Securing Vivaldi
We experimented our detection scheme on a Vivaldi system sub-
jected to a colluding isolation attack as described in [11]. In this
scenario, malicious nodes are trying to isolate a target node, by re-
pulsing all other nodes away from it. The malicious nodes agree
on a large “exclusion” zone around the target node and randomly
set their own coordinates outside this zone to try and attract honest
nodes out of the exclusion zone. Note that an attacker always uses
the same coordinate when lying to a given honest node.
5.2.1 Detection Method Performance
Figure 9: ROC curves. Each tick on the plots corresponds to a
different value of the test’s significance level (α).
To evaluate the efficiency of the test, we first plot in figure 9,
ROC (Receiver Operation Characteristics) curves observed for dif-
ferent significance levels (α) and several intensities of attacks.
These plots show, for each significance level4, the point corre-
sponding to the false positive rate along the x-axis and to the true
4Significance level valuesα always increase as a ROC curve is
positive rate along the y-axis, with one curve per malicious group
size. Obviously, the closer to the upper left corner of the graph a
curve is, the better, since such points correspond to high true posi-
tive rates (i.e. a high proportion of positives being reported as such
by the test) for low false positive rates (i.e. a small proportion of
negatives incorrectly reported as positives). We observe that from
this perspective, the detection method can be considered to be ex-
cellent for 20% of malicious nodes or less, and still performs well
even under heavy attack of up to about 30% of malicious nodes,
while the power of the detection method naturally decreases as the
malicious population becomes more significative. Another interest-
ing properties of ROC curves is that they show the optimal range
for the significance level. Indeed, as the slope of the ROC curve
flattens, the increase in true positive rate is proportionally smaller
than the corresponding increase in false positives. In other words, a
higher significance level, although it always increases the true pos-
itive rate of the test, is not always productive as it eventually does
more bad than good through increased false positive rates (i.e. the
proportion of normal embedding steps that are aborted increases).
This means that the significance level of the test should be set to a
value that yields a point in the “elbow” of the ROC curve. Based
on figure 9, we can deduce that a significance level of 5% seems to
be a good compromise.
Figure 10: True positive test fraction.
Figure 10 shows the true positive test fraction of the detection
method for various test significance levels under various intensity
of attacks. We see that the proportion of positive tests that are
true positives is constantly high, regardless of the significance level
chosen, for moderate to quite significant proportions of malicious
nodes in the population (up to 20% of malicious nodes). However,
thereafter the proportion of correct positive tests starts to decrease,
although the rate of decrease is inversely proportional to the sig-
nificance level used. This is because a higher significance level
produces more positive tests, catching most malicious embedding
steps, and so many more false positives are needed to make up a
significant proportion of these. In light of this, a significance level
of 5% offers a good compromise.
Figures 11 and 12 show the false positive and negative rates re-
spectively. As expected, a higher significance level results in a
more aggressive test that incorrectly classifies a larger portion of
normal embedding steps (figure 11) as malicious, while a more le-
nient test (lower significance level) wrongly reports a higher pro-
portion of malicious embedding steps as normal (figure 12).
Incorrect test results do have a negative impact on the embedding
system: false positives artificially reduce the size of available nor-
“followed” from the origin. In our experiments, we used values of
1%, 3%, 5% and 10% forα.
Figure 11: False Positive Rate.
Figure 12: False negative rate.
mal nodes that can be used for normal embedding; false negatives
give malicious nodes opportunities to corrupt and distort the coor-
dinate space, which can propagate through the system and result in
a greater proportion of normal nodes being identified as malicious
(false positives) because of mis-positioning. This is exemplified
in figure 11, where the false positive rate increases faster, as the
population of malicious nodes increases, for lower values of the
significance level of the test. Also, despite the fact that the false
negative rate curves (figure 12) clearly exhibit negative slopes, one
should note that these rates decrease much slower than the increase
in malicious population. That is to say that as the number of ma-
licious nodes in the system increases, the number of false negative
does increase, and more damage is incurred in the coordinate space.
Although the accuracy of coordinate systems increases with the
number of participating nodes, false negatives can therefore have a
greater impact on the system than false positives and should there-
fore be thwarted in priority. As the false negative rates exhibited by
tests with significance levels of 5% and 10% are roughly similar,
while the more aggressive test yields proportionally a higher false
positive rate, the significance level of 5% is a good compromise.
5.2.2 Embedding System Performance
From section 5.2.1, it should be clear that a significance level
of 5% gives the overall best test performance. We therefore set the
significance level to this value and assess the resistance of a Vivaldi
system under various intensity of attacks.
The cumulative distribution function of the measured relative er-
rors, across all normal nodes, after convergence (in the sense of
error convergence as defined in [12]) is shown in figure 13 (for the
time being, ignore the curve entitled ”Using Dedicated Surveyors
for Embedding”). We see that the detection mechanism renders
Figure 13: Distribution of measured relative errors.
the system practically immune to the attack, when the proportion
of malicious nodes is 30%, or less, of the overall node population.
Although the system does indeed show degraded performance for
higher intensities of malicious attacks, the steeper slope of the CDF
with detection, compared to the corresponding curve without (e.g.
curves for 50% of malicious nodes), shows that the detection mech-
anism is not completely overwhelmed and still offers good protec-
tion by significantly reducing the impact of the attack.
5.3 Securing NPS
To test our proposed detection method in the context of the NPS
coordinate system, we chose to study the effects of colluding iso-
lation attack as described in [11]. The malicious nodes cooper-
ate with each other and behave in a correct and honest way until
enough of them become reference points at each layer. As soon as
a minimum number of malicious reference points has been reached
(in our experiments this number is set to 5) in a layer, these at-
tackers identify a common set of victims (50% of the normal nodes
they know from the layer directly below). When involved in the
positioning of their victims, the malicious nodes agree to pretend
they are all clustered into a remote (far away) part of the coordinate
space and try and push the victims into a remote location at the
”opposite” of where the attackers pretend to be, in order to isolate
the victims from the other nodes in the coordinate space. In order
to evade detection, including the basic detection method proposed
in NPS and which isalways turned on in our experiments, the ma-
licious nodes use the sophisticated anti-detection method proposed
in [11] during their attacks.
5.3.1 Detection Method Performance
Figure 14 shows the ROC curves for the detection test in NPS.
These curves show characteristics similar to those observed in the
Vivaldi system (see section 5.2.1), albeit slightly better. In par-
ticular, these curves shows that the detection method withstands
heavier attacks better in NPS than in Vivaldi.
There are several reasons for this. First, the basic detection
method in NPS works in concert with our own, providing greater
opportunities to identify malicious behavior. Also, by its very na-
ture, the embedding method in NPS is less prone to mis-positioning
error propagation amongst normal nodes, as nodes in the lower
layer do not take part in the embedding of other nodes. And fi-
nally, by design, the attack considered in this section makes fewer
victims than that studied in section 5.2 (i.e. 50% of normal nodes
as victims vs 100% in Vivaldi).
The same observation is also true for the false positive and false
negative rates (not shown) with again, overall, a significance level
Figure 14: ROC curves.
of 5% seemingly offering the best compromise between “catch-
ing” malicious embedding steps while not being overly cautious
and over-reacting to normal variations in network conditions.
The similarities between the test performance under NPS and Vi-
valdi, despite the different nature of the attacks under consideration
and even differences in coordinate “structure” (two-dimensional
with height for Vivaldi versus eight-dimensional for NPS), il-
lustrates the generality of the proposed detection method. This
is because our detection test is based on the modelization of a
dimension-less quantity (the relative error) which is at the very core
of any embedding method.
5.3.2 Embedding System Performance
We study the performance of the NPS embedding system when
subject to increasing intensity of attacks, while being protected by
our detection scheme. Note that in this section, “detection off”
really means that our proposed detection mechanism is not used,
but the basic NPS detection mechanism is still “on”.
Figure 15: Distribution of measured relative errors.
Figure 15 shows the cumulative distribution function of relative
errors in the system. We note again similarities with the dynamic
behavior of similar Vivaldi systems, except that the tail of the CDF
for 50% malicious nodes with detection is heavier than the corre-
sponding curve in the Vivaldi case. Keeping in mind that in NPS
not all nodes are victims and that not all normal nodes will prop-
agate mis-positioning errors, this indicates that the attack is still
quite effective against its victims, albeit “dampened” by the de-
tection mechanism. This effect is compounded by the fact that,
with our simple detection protocol, malicious nodes that have found
their way into the layer hierarchy of NPS and act as Reference
Points, do stay in place throughout the experiment, despite numer-
ous detections of their corrupt embedding steps.
Nevertheless, the detection method proposed affords near immu-
nity to the system up to rather severe attack conditions (e.g. about
30% of malicious nodes in the system).
6. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a method for malicious behavior detection to
secure the embedding phase of Internet coordinate systems. Our
method does not rely on the geometric properties of the coordinate
space, and is therefore unaffected by potential triangular inequality
violations which often occur in the Internet [20, 21]. Instead, our
detection test is based on the modelization of the dynamic relative
errors observed in a clean system. The relative error is a dimension-
less quantity which is at the very core ofany embedding method,
leading us to believe that our proposed detection test can effec-
tively identify malicious behavior in very many embedding proto-
cols and coordinate space structures that are under a potential very
large range of attacks. The experiments presented in this paper do
show that the performance of the detection test is effectively the
same in two different scenarios involving different embedding pro-
tocols and different attacks. As far as we know, this is the first such
general detection test, capable of surviving sophisticated attacks.
Also, we consider exclusively attacks aimed at distorting the co-
ordinate space, carried out by nodes inside the embedding system.
Our method thus succeeds where more obvious methods based on
authentication would fail.
In practice, we introduced the concept of Surveyor nodes which,
by design, are immune to embedding attacks and do observe the
properties of the coordinate system in clean conditions. The Sur-
veyors make up the basis of a “security infrastructure”. It is impor-
tant to note that the deployment of Surveyors does not equate to im-
posing an embedding infrastructure: peer-to-peer based embedding
systems, like Vivaldi, do retain their infrastructure-less embedding
characteristics. Indeed, apart from a test to accept or filter out em-
bedding steps, our method does not entail any change to the op-
erations of the embedding protocols. Even though this paper does
not address the problem of external attacks on the infrastructure
(e.g. denial of service attacks, “link clogging”, etc.), we note that
solutions to such attacks have been proposed elsewhere (e.g. [23]).
The operations of the proposed detection protocol were delib-
erately kept simple and tested on systems where Surveyors were
chosen randomly, although their representativeness increases with
closeness to their “clients”. Despite the possibly non-optimal Sur-
veyor distribution resulting from such a choice, the results obtained
show the effectiveness of our proposal in securing Internet coordi-
nate systems. Nevertheless, given the enhanced coordinate service
afforded by our detection test and simple detection protocol, one
might envisage that ISPs may readily want to deploy Surveyors
within their network to offer enhanced coordinate service to their
customers. Such business-driven strategic deployment can only im-
prove representativeness of Surveyors, and thus improve the secu-
rity of large-scale coordinate service, with possibly a much smaller
proportion of Surveyors than the upper bound reported in this paper
(as illustrated by the simple k-means deployment in section 3.3).
More sophisticated Surveyor selection mechanisms than those pre-
sented in this paper could also result in better security through bet-
ter representativeness in large-scale coordinate systems. We believe
that the increased robustness provided by our proposal could act as
a catalyzer to the acceptance and deployment of large-scale coordi-
nate services in the Internet.
Nevertheless, with a trusted Surveyor infrastructure in place, it
could be argued that using these Surveyors for positioning other
nodes would ensure immunity to any insider attacks. For Vivaldi,
using the Surveyors for positioning would mean that normal nodes
only choose Surveyors as neighbors. The embedding performance
of such Vivaldi scenario is depicted by the “using dedicated Survey-
ors for embedding”-curve of figure 13, with the1% Surveyors of
the simple k-means deployment method. It can clearly be seen that
such use of the Surveyor infrastructure trades embedding accuracy
for increased security. A similar NPS scenario, where only Sur-
veyors would be chosen as Landmarks and reference points, unsur-
prisingly led to embedding performance equivalent to a clean NPS
system, as the hierarchical embedding structure in both systems are
very similar. An NPS system where only Surveyors would be cho-
sen as Landmarks and reference points actually looks like a hybrid
system between GNP [1] and NPS: it is a fixed infrastructure sys-
tem (like GNP), but with distributed Landmark coordinate compu-
tation and a hierarchical structure (like NPS). In both cases above, a
clear scalability issue arises as the load on each Surveyor increases
as their number decreases. In light of the discussion on strategic
Surveyor deployment, as well as lower bound on the number of
required Surveyors (see above and section 3.3), it is not clear that
the solution of embedding against Surveyors only is practically vi-
able. Even if it were, a hybrid solution, where Surveyors would be
used for malicious activity detection under mild to medium attack
intensities and exclusively used for embedding under more severe
conditions, would be more accurate and afford better scalability.
Furthermore, each node using malicious behavior detection does
so in isolation, as there is no cooperation between nodes in a bid to
improve detection and identification of malicious nodes. Instead,
any embedding step identified as malicious by a node is simply,
and quietly, ignored and discarded locally. One of the reasons the
detection protocol was designed in this way was to avoid poten-
tial denial-of-service attacks that could result from the sharing of
information about malicious activity, with the view of excluding
offending nodes. Indeed, such an approach could open the door to
an attack that consists in trying to get honest nodes excluded from
the system through the collusion of wrong malicious reports. Trust
propagation could be used to mitigate or remove this threat and thus
allow detection cooperation amongst nodes, which could only im-
prove the security of the overall system and push the boundary of
applicability of the detection by reducing further the impact of very
large-scale attacks on the embedding system.
A property of coordinate systems that has been observed in large-
scale deployment is coordinate drift [7]. While the drift rate is low
enough that it does not interfere with our detection method, and can
thus be ignored, drift, and in general coordinate variations, can nev-
ertheless be an issue for applications using the coordinate system
for distance estimation (the “usage phase” of the coordinate ser-
vice). Indeed, even though the embedding phase of the system may
have been secured, this would not prevent a malicious node from
blatantly lying about its coordinates when a node requests them for
simple distance estimation during normal use of the service. This
normal use of the service must therefore also be secured, perhaps
through the use of validity period for “certified” coordinates. This
is left as future work. However, because lying about its own coor-
dinate during a simple distance estimation only fools a single other
node at a time, this type of application-level attack is less danger-
ous than an attack on the embedding phase itself which can distort
the coordinate space and thus spoil the coordinate computations of
unsuspecting honest nodes (and thus bias distance estimates involv-
ing these nodes). This is the reason why we chose to address the
problem of securing the embedding phase first.
7. REFERENCES
[1] T. E. Ng, and H. Zhang,Predicting internet network distance
with coordinates-based approaches, in Proceedings of the
IEEE INFOCOM, New York, June 2002.
[2] M. Pias, J. Crowcroft, S. Wilbur, S. Bhatti, and T. Harris,
Lighthouses for Scalable Distributed Location, in Proceedings
of International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
(IPTPS03), Berkeley, February 2003.
[3] M. Costa, M. Castro, A. Rowstron, and P. Key,Practical
Internet coordinates for distance estimation, in Proceedings of
the IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing
Systems (ICDCS), Tokyo, March 2004.
[4] T. E. Ng and H. Zhang,A Network Positioning System for the
Internet, in Proceedings of the USENIX annual technical
conference, Boston, June 2004.
[5] F. Dabek, R. Cox, F. Kaashoek and R. Morris,Vivaldi: A
decentralized network coordinate system, in Proceedings of
the ACM SIGCOMM, Portland, Oregon, August 2004.
[6] Y. Shavitt and T. Tankel,Big-Bang Simulation for embedding
network distances in Euclidean Space, in Proceedings of the
IEEE INFOCOM, June 2002.
[7] J. Ledlie, P. Gardner, and M. Seltzer,Network Coordinates in
the Wild, in Proceedings of NSDI, Cambridge, MA, April
2007.
[8] I. Stoica, R. Morris, D. Karger, M. F. Kaashoek, and
H. Balakrishnan,Chord: A Scalable Peer-to-peer Lookup
Service for Internet Applications, in Proceedings of
SIGCOMM, San Diego, CA, August 2001.
[9] Azureus BitTorrent Client.
http://azureus.sourceforce.net
[10] www.skype.com
[11] M. A. Kaafar, L. Mathy, T. Turletti, and W. Dabbous,Virtual
Networks under Attack: Disrupting Internet Coordinate
Systems, in Proceedings of CoNext 2006, Lisboa, December,
2006.
[12] M. A. Kaafar, L. Mathy, T. Turletti and W. Dabbous,Real
attacks on virtual networks: Vivaldi out of tune, in
Proceedings of the SIGCOMM workshop on Large Scale
Attack Defense (LSAD),Pisa, September 2006.
[13] R.E. Kalman,A New Approach to Linear Filtering and
Prediction Problems, in Transactions of the ASME - Journal
of Basic Engineering Vol. 82: pp. 35-45, 1960.
[14] R.E. Kalman, and R.S. Bucy,New Results in Linear
Filtering and Prediction Theory, in Transactions of the ASME
- Journal of Basic Engineering Vol. 83: pp. 95-107, 1961.
[15] Y. Zhang, N. Duffield, V. Paxson, and S. Shenker,On the
Constancy of Internet Path Properties, in Proceedings of
ACM SIGCOMM Internet Measurement Workshop, San
Francisco, CA, November 2001.
[16] Z. Ghahramani, G. Hinton,Parameter Estimation for Linear
Dynamical Systems, University of Toronto, Technical Report
CRG-TR-96-2.
[17] K. P. Gummadi, S. Saroiu, and S. D. Gribble,King:
Estimating Latency between Arbitrary Internet End Hosts, in
Proceedings of SIGCOMM Internet Mesasurement Workshop
(IMW), Pittsburgh, PA,November 2002.
[18] H. Lilliefors, On the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality
with mean and variance unknown, Journal of the American
Statistical Association, Vol. 62. pp. 399-402, June, 1967.
[19] A. Soule, K. Salamatian, and N. Taft,Combining Filtering
and Statistical Methods for Anomaly Detection, in
Proceedings of Internet Measurement Conference (IMC),
Berkeley, October, 2005.
[20] E. K. Lua, T. griffin, M. Pias, H. Zheng, and J. Crowcroft,
On the accuracy of Embeddings for Internet Coordinate
Systems, in Proceedings of Internet Measurement Conference
(IMC), Berkeley, October 2005.
[21] H. Zheng, E. K. Lua, M. Pias, and T. Griffin,Internet
Routing Policies and Roun-Trip Times, in Proceedings of the
Passive Active Measurement (PAM), Boston, March 2005.
[22] J. Bilmes,A gentle tutorial on the EM algorithm including
gaussian mixtures and baum-welch, Technical Report
TR-97-021, International Computer Science Institute,
Berkeley, CA, 1997.
[23] A. Keromytis, V. Misra and D. Rubenstein,SOS: Secure
Overlay Services, in Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM,
Pittsburgh, PA, August 2002.
